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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
SEAN GRIFFITH: Welcome. Good afternoon and welcome to
Fordham Law School.
I am Sean Griffith and I am a professor here. I am also the T.J.
Maloney Chair in Business Law, and I have the pleasure of being one of
the faculty moderators of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial
Law. It is my pleasure to thank you all for joining us and to welcome you
here for the annual symposium of our Fordham Law School Journal of
Corporate & Financial Law.
Today we are discussing whistleblowers in the era of SarbanesOxley and Dodd-Frank. We all know, or we have all come to know, the
important role of whistleblowers in protecting the integrity of the U.S.
financial system, and we have all also become acutely aware of the need
of the U.S. financial system to have its integrity protected. The number of
corporate scandals that we see—there seem to be several a week, the most
recent scandals including Wells Fargo1 and Volkswagen,2 as well as many
others.3
Since the collapse of Enron in the early 2000s,4 whistleblowers have
assumed an increasingly important role in ensuring the integrity of
corporate America. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for
example, has developed a comprehensive whistleblower program.5
Just this morning, I was reading a news blog and there was an article
about a Government Accountability Project (GAP) report on how to work
1. Matt Egan, Wells Fargo Uncovers Up To 1.4 Million More Fake Accounts, CNN
MONEY (Aug. 31, 2017, 12:34 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/31/investing/wellsfargo-fake-accounts/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z6RC-NRUG].
2. Russell Hotten, Volkswagen: The Scandal Explained, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772 [https://perma.cc/X67W-9HYD].
3. See, e.g., Ross Kohan, Three of 2017’s Biggest Corporate Scandals, FORTUNE
(Dec. 21, 2017), http://fortune.com/video/2017/12/21/three-of-2017s-biggest-corporatescandals/ [https://perma.cc/LHL6-UPAZ].
4. Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron’s Collapse: The Overview;
Enron Corp. Files Largest U.S. Claim for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/03/business/enron-s-collapse-the-overview-enroncorp-files-largest-us-claim-for-bankruptcy.html?mcubz=0
[https://perma.cc/QBJ6J9A6].
5. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODDFRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/files/owb-annualreport-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/KF68-66LC].
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with whistleblowers, which provided a number of tips for journalists
working with whistleblowers and the kinds of things that journalists
should advise their whistleblower sources.6 Its suggestions included:
• Before exposing themselves to risk, journalists should counsel their
whistleblowers to talk to a lawyer who is experienced in assisting
whistleblowers.7 That is now all of us, or will be by the end of the
afternoon.
• Whistleblowers should consult their loved ones before taking the
risk and exposing their family to risk.8
• Whistleblowers should create a contemporaneous paper trail or
diary of everything that happens, including when they raise the
complaints and issues and whether they faced any retaliation.9
• They should keep their evidence in a safe place.10
• They should organize support for themselves among their
colleagues as much as possible.11
• They should always communicate with journalists and other
outsiders through secure means, such as Signal or WhatsApp,12 instead of
communicating through regular texting and other technological means
that I do not fully understand.
But the message here is that this is an important topic and that
journalists and others who work with insiders who are exposing
potentially bad acts inside a corporation need to treat their subjects with
care, and that is what we are going to learn about today.
We have a terrific group of speakers, and I have a number of people
to thank, including Professor Caroline Gentile, who is my co-advisor on
the wonderful Journal of Corporate & Financial Law.
The Journal of Corporate & Financial Law is a leading journal here
at Fordham Law School. It was founded in 1995 and is one of the leading
student-edited journals on business law in the entire country. In fact, the
Corporate Journal is ranked as the number one most-cited specialty
6.

GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, WORKING WITH WHISTLEBLOWERS: A GUIDE
JOURNALISTS (2017), https://www.whistleblower.org/sites/default/files/GUIDE%
20TO%20UPLOAD_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/FRV8-935E].
7. Id. at 20.
8. Id. at 21.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 21–22.
12. Id. at 22.
FOR
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journal in the fields of banking and finance.13 Fordham Law takes great
pride in the Corporate Journal, and indeed in all of our student-edited
publications.
I want to thank each of our panelists; all of our alumni who have
come back, including our alumna Tracey McNeil, who is one of our
panelists; thanks to the staff members of the Fordham Journal of
Corporate & Financial Law for organizing the event; and a special thanks
to Ian Engoron, the Journal’s Symposium Editor, who has shouldered
much of the organizational labor for this event.
I will turn it over to Ian to introduce our keynote speaker.
IAN ENGORON: Thank you, Professor Griffith, for that kind
introduction, and good afternoon to everyone. As the Symposium Editor
for the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, I am honored
and thrilled to welcome you here for our annual symposium entitled,
“What Would We Do Without Them: Whistleblowers in the Era of
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank.”
As Professor Griffith noted, we are honored to have a fantastic group
of prominent academics and practitioners here to share their knowledge
on the subject of whistleblowers.
Our keynote speaker is Jane Norberg, Chief of the Office of the
Whistleblower in the Division of Enforcement at the Securities and
Exchange Commission,14 and we are extremely grateful and fortunate to
have her here today.
On the panel we are excited to hear from Alice BrightSky, Senior
Director of Compliance Programs here at Fordham Law School;15 Tracey
McNeil, Class of ‘99, who is the first ever Ombudsman at the Securities

13. According to the ranking system maintained by the Law Library at Washington
& Lee University School of Law. See Law Journals: Submissions and Ranking, 2009 –
2016, WASH. & LEE U. SCH. L., http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/index.aspx [https://perma.cc/V
2PS-GFTG] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017) (to replicate the search results, search “Subject:
Banking and Finance;” then “Edit type: Student-edited;” and “Ranking Criteria: Journal
cites”).
14. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Jane Norberg Named Chief of SEC
Whistleblower Office (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016201.html [https://perma.cc/RA78-45LJ].
15. Alice BrightSky, FORDHAM U. SCH. L., https://www.fordham.edu/info/23642/a__b/9500/alice_brightsky [https://perma.cc/2CBR-U4GQ] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
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and Exchange Commission;16 Jennifer M. Pacella, Assistant Professor of
Law at the Zicklin School of Business at Baruch College, City University
of New York, who specializes in whistleblower law;17 we are also joined
by Judith Weinstock, Assistant Regional Director at the Securities and
Exchange Commission New York Regional office; and finally Jason
Zuckerman, Principal of Zuckerman Law and leading whistleblower
award and retaliation attorney.18
As anyone who keeps up with financial news can tell you, both
traditional and new forms of corporate fraud are committed on a frequent
basis. As corporations and regulators push forward in an increasingly
high-stakes, fast-paced, and technological world, they would do well to
recognize the potential benefits—or downfalls—of embracing
whistleblowers to help in their fight against corporate fraud.
Today we aim to foster a meaningful discussion regarding the
increasingly predominant world of corporate whistleblowers and their
evolving role under the regulatory regimes in force pursuant to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX or Sarbanes-Oxley) of 200219 and the DoddFrank Act of 2010.20
On that note, please join me in welcoming our keynote speaker,
Chief Jane Norberg.

16. Biography: Tracey L. McNeil, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/biography/mcneil-tracey-l [https://perma.cc/R624-HHB4] (last
visited Dec. 20, 2017).
17. Jennifer M. Pacella, BARUCH C.: ZICKLIN SCH. BUS., https://zicklin.baruch.
cuny.edu/faculty-profile/jennifer-m-pacella/ [https://perma.cc/JSH7-6QLP] (last visited
Apr. 14, 2018).
18. Jason Zuckerman, ZUCKERMAN L., https://www.zuckermanlaw.com/attorneysprofile/jason-zuckerman/ [https://perma.cc/C2CQ-2W5Z] (last updated Dec. 10, 2017).
19. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A
(2012)).
20. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010).
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
JANE NORBERG: Thank you. Good afternoon, and thank you very
much for inviting me to speak with you today.
Before I begin my remarks, I have to give a requisite disclaimer that
anything I say here today is my own view and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Commission and its staff.21
I am pleased that Fordham’s Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
is holding today’s symposium. When it comes to the topic of the
importance of whistleblowers, the staff of the Journal hit the proverbial
nail on the head when they came up with the title of today’s symposium,
“Whistleblowers: What Would We Do Without Them?”
Whistleblowers provide an invaluable public service, often at great
personal and professional sacrifice and peril. I cannot overstate the
appreciation that the Office of the Whistleblower staff has and that I
personally have for the willingness of whistleblowers to come forward
with evidence of possible securities laws violations. Whistleblowers have
had a transformative impact on the SEC’s enforcement program, both in
terms of the detection of illegal conduct and moving our investigations
forward quicker and through the use of fewer resources.
A significant reason for the success of the program is the efforts we
have undertaken to protect whistleblowers from retaliation and from
removing roadblocks from whistleblowers’ paths.
Truly, a key function of the SEC’s whistleblower program is
whistleblower protection. I am attuned to the risks whistleblowers take in
their careers and their professional livelihoods. My colleagues and I in the
Office of the Whistleblower hear their stories every day, the risks they
take and the sacrifices they make to help the Commission hold
wrongdoers accountable. We also have heard stories from whistleblowers
about their passion and dedication to the best interests of the investor and
for standing up when they see a wrong.
Today, the first area I will focus on is the intersection between the
SEC’s whistleblower program and the Agency’s efforts to stop fraud and
wrongdoing, especially when it targets vulnerable and unsophisticated
21. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims
responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Commission or of the author’s colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
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investors; second, I want to focus on how whistleblowers help the Agency
return money to harmed investors; and finally, I will discuss efforts to
protect whistleblowers who report wrongdoing.
Protecting the Main Street investor—or “Mr. and Ms. 401(k)” as our
Chairman calls them—is one of the guiding principles of the
Commission.22 Whistleblowers are key components in our enforcement
arsenal. The value of whistleblower information in protecting the Main
Street investor is displayed in the violations that were uncovered and
halted based on actionable information provided by whistleblowers.
In the past year, we have seen how whistleblower information has
aided SEC staff in detecting and stopping violations that impacted
ordinary investors, including in some instances through active ongoing
investment schemes that directly targeted and victimized unsophisticated
investors.
In January, the Commission awarded a whistleblower who provided
information that helped end an ongoing fraud that predominately targeted
a more vulnerable investor community.23 In January, again, the
Commission awarded three whistleblowers whose information halted a
scheme through which hundreds of investors had fallen victim, many of
whom were unsophisticated.24 Just one week ago, the Commission
awarded a whistleblower who provided new information and substantial
corroborating documentation of a securities law violation by a registered
entity that impacted retail investors.25
A second area where whistleblowers add demonstrable value is in
the return of funds to harmed investors. This is exhibited most critically
by the hundreds of millions of dollars returned to victimized investors as

22. Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Economic
Club of New York (July 12, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/remarkseconomic-club-new-york [https://perma.cc/7QZR-TX5Q].
23. Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No.
79,747 (Jan. 6, 2017) https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2017/34-79747.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6WZP-S9DB].
24. Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No.
79,853 (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2017/34-79853.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F6F5-595P].
25. Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No.
81,857 (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2017/34-81857.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2LBH-38RW].
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a result of actionable information that whistleblowers have reported to the
Agency.26
Since the inception of the whistleblower program through the present
day, more than $975 million in sanctions have been ordered against
wrongdoers in cases brought using information from whistleblowers who
have received awards under the program, including approximately $670
million in disgorgement and interest, the majority of which has been or
will be distributed to harmed investors.27 Indeed, two of the
Commission’s larger awards specifically cited the speed with which the
whistleblower tip enabled our staff to move and secure funds for harmed
investors.28
There are several cases brought by the Commission with the aid of
whistleblower information that illustrate this concept.
In July of this year, the Commission announced an award to a
company insider who provided the Agency with critical information that
helped stop a fraud that would have otherwise been difficult to detect.29
Millions of dollars were returned to harmed investors as a result of the
SEC’s ensuing investigation and enforcement action.30
In November of 2016, the Commission announced an award to a
whistleblower who promptly came forward with valuable information
that enabled the SEC to move quickly and initiate an enforcement action
against wrongdoers before they could squander the money, leading to a
near total recovery of investor funds.31
In October of 2013, the Commission announced it had made an
award to a whistleblower whose information led to an enforcement action
that recovered substantial investor funds.32 Less than six months after
26.
27.

U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 1.
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2017-annual-reportwhistleblower-program.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY9K-T69G].
28. Id.
29. Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No.
81,227 (July 27, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2017/34-81227.pdf [https://
perma.cc/44CC-548S].
30. Id.
31. Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No.
79,294 (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/files/34-79294_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NU9T-BXKC].
32. Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No.
70,554 (Sept. 30, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2013/34-70554.pdf [https://
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receiving this whistleblower’s tip, the Commission was able to bring an
enforcement action against the perpetrators and secure investor funds.33
Another measure of the impact of the whistleblower program is in
the increased volume of information that the Commission has received
since the program has been operational. Awareness of the program has
grown tremendously over the years, and the number of whistleblower tips
and complaints received by the SEC has steadily increased each year.
Since the inception of the program through the end of fiscal year
2016, the Office has received more than 18,000 tips34 from
whistleblowers in every state in the United States35 as well as from 103
foreign countries.36 In fiscal year 2016, the Commission received over
4,200 tips, which is more than a forty percent increase in tips since fiscal
year 2012, the first year for which we have full data.37
And, of course, the success of the program can be seen, in part, in
the approximately $160 million we have paid to forty-seven
whistleblowers for their valuable information and assistance since the
program’s inception.38 In fiscal year 2016 alone, the SEC issued awards
totaling over $57 million, higher than all award amounts issued in
previous years combined.39
I want to pause here for a minute to talk about the source of the funds
that we use to pay whistleblowers. This is an area where we frequently
get questions.
Whistleblower awards are paid from the SEC’s Investor Protection
Fund, which was established by Congress.40 The Fund is financed through
monetary sanctions paid by securities law violators in actions brought by
perma.cc/Q3Z9-GDXB]; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Awards More
Than $14 Million to Whistleblower (Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2013-209 [https://perma.cc/QW7F-NKFD].
33. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 32.
34. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 34.
35. Id. at app. B; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE DODD- FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM app. B (2015), https://www.sec.gov/
files/owb-annual-report-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6F6-LM2K].
36. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 26.
37. Id. at 23.
38. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Whistleblower
Award of More Than a Million Dollars (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017-195 [https://perma.cc/FET6-XPY6].
39. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 1.
40. Id. at 29 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(g)(2)(A) (2012)).
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the SEC.41 Money has not been taken or withheld from harmed investors
to pay whistleblower awards.42 So, the whistleblowers’ awards have not
reduced any money that we have returned to harmed investors.
As you can see from the examples noted, whistleblowers do provide
a valuable service, and, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, the service
can come at great personal sacrifice and professional peril.
This is particularly true for corporate insiders. Corporate insiders are
an extremely valuable category of whistleblower because they often have
firsthand knowledge of wrongdoing and can help propel an investigation
with their evidence and their insights. However, I do want to note that you
do not have to be an insider to participate in the SEC’s whistleblower
program.43
In general, corporate whistleblowers are coming forward to us.
Approximately sixty-five percent of award recipients were insiders of the
entity about which they reported.44 I should also mention that eighty
percent of those award recipients who were employees raised their
concerns internally or were aware that their supervisor was aware of the
violation before or at the same time that they reported to the
Commission.45
But the possibility of receiving an award is not the only reason that
corporate insiders are blowing the whistle. They are doing so because of
the comfort that the Commission’s actions in the whistleblower protection
area has provided. In other words, these actions show whistleblowers that
we will protect them and take actions against their employers when
appropriate.
The Commission’s whistleblower protection efforts to date can be
divided into three different categories. The first two categories, antiretaliation actions and actions against attempts to impede reporting, grow
out of the statutory framework that shaped the Commission’s
whistleblower program.46 The third category has involved participating as
amicus curiae in private retaliation lawsuits in federal courts.47

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19–21.
Id. at 22.
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The Commission’s authority to bring actions for retaliation against a
whistleblower derives from Section 21F(h)(1) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, which states in plain terms that no employer shall retaliate
against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment simply
because the employee has exercised his or her rights as a whistleblower
and lawfully reported possible evidence of wrongdoing regarding a
securities law violation.48
We in the Commission’s Office of the Whistleblower identify and
monitor whistleblower complaints alleging retaliation by employers or
former employers in response to an employee’s reporting of possible
securities law violations. We also serve as subject matter experts to
Enforcement Division staff on investigations into these types of
violations. From these efforts the Commission has brought three
successful administrative proceedings, all of which provide important
themes for employers and prospective whistleblowers alike.
Last year, oil and gas company SandRidge Energy agreed to settle
Commission charges that it used illegal separation agreements and
retaliated against a whistleblower who expressed concerns internally
about how its reserves were being calculated.49 Specifically, the
whistleblower was one of several employees who were offered
promotions on condition that they would assure the company that they
supported management and were committed to the company.50 The
whistleblower declined the promotion and declined to provide assurances
sought by management due to the whistleblower’s ongoing concerns
about the reserve’s process.51 Ultimately, the whistleblower was
terminated after a discussion amongst senior management about the
disruptive nature of the whistleblower’s internal report.52
Also last year, the Commission charged casino gaming company
International Game Technology with violating the prohibition against

48.
49.

15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1) (2012).
In re SandRidge Energy, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79,607, at 5 (Dec. 20,
2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-79607.pdf [https://perma.cc/ ND
R2-7QSV].
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 6.
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retaliating against a whistleblower.53 The whistleblower had received
positive performance evaluations throughout the whistleblower’s tenure
with the company54 and a special retention bonus was discussed to retain
the whistleblower.55 Shortly after the whistleblower received a favorable
midyear review, the whistleblower raised concerns to senior managers, to
the company’s internal compliance hotline, and to the SEC that the
company’s publicly reported financials may have been misstated.56 The
whistleblower became concerned that the company’s cost accounting
model could result in inaccuracies in the company’s financial statements
and reported these concerns to management and the Commission.57
Within weeks of raising the concerns, the whistleblower was slated for
termination and removed from significant work assignments.58 The
company conducted an internal investigation into the whistleblower’s
allegations and determined that its reported financial statements were not
inaccurate.59 Shortly thereafter, the company fired the whistleblower.60
In 2014, the Commission charged hedge fund advisory firm
Paradigm Capital Management for retaliating against their head trader for
reporting trading activity to the SEC that demonstrated that the firm was
engaged in prohibited principal transactions.61 After the trader notified the
company of the report to the Commission, the company immediately
began retaliating, including by removing the whistleblower from the head
trader position, stripping the whistleblower of supervisory responsibility,
and, ironically, changing the whistleblower’s job function from head
trader to full-time compliance assistant.62 The Commission charged the
firm and its principal with engaging in prohibited principal transactions
and charged the firm with making a false filing with the Commission and
53. In re Int’l Game Tech., Exchange Act Release No. 78,991, at 2 (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78991.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9AH-99
CG].
54. Id.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 4–5.
59. Id. at 5.
60. Id.
61. In re Paradigm Capital Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 72,393,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3857, at 2 (June 16, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/
litigation/admin/2014/34-72393.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4UG-VC9P].
62. Id. at 6.
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retaliating against the employee.63 Among other relief, the hedge fund and
its principal paid over $2 million in combined monetary sanctions for all
of the violations.64 And, at the end of the day, we awarded the
whistleblower over $600,000.65
Several themes emerge from these retaliation cases that are worth
noting.
• First, the company does not need to be charged with violating the
underlying securities law violation reported by the whistleblower to be
charged with retaliation. The charges against International Game
Technology were standalone retaliation charges.66 All that is necessary is
that the whistleblower reasonably believe that he or she is reporting a
possible securities law violation.
• Second, retaliation can take many forms short of outright firing,
such as a reduction of responsibilities without justification or explanation.
Section 21F(h)(1) expressly covers not just discharging, but any act to
demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate
against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment.67
• Third, strong enforcement of the anti-retaliation protections is
critical to the success of the SEC’s whistleblower program. Reviewing
fact patterns of retaliation will continue to be a priority for the Office of
the Whistleblower.
In addition to protecting whistleblowers from retaliation once they
have reported to the Commission, Rule 21F-17 of the Exchange Act also
prevents individuals and entities from taking steps to silence potential
whistleblowers before they contact us, including through the threatened
enforcement of confidentiality agreements.68 The Commission has
brought nine settled actions against companies for actions that violated
Rule 21F-17, the majority of which were in connection with companies’
separation and severance agreements.69
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 12.
Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No.
74,826 (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2015/34-74826.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UEF5-QH2Q].
66. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 21.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1) (2012).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17 (2012).
69. In re HomeStreet, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79,844 (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/34-79844.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AQF-PB
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The Commission has brought three actions against companies where
the evidence shows that the restrictive agreements either targeted
communications with the SEC or were used in circumstances that, in
effect, chilled whistleblowers from coming forward or from continuing to
communicate with the Commission.
For example, in the Commission’s 2016 action against AnheuserBusch InBev SA/NV for violations of Rule 21F-17, as well as violations
of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, the company entered into a separation agreement
including strict confidentiality provisions with an employee who had
reported internally concerns about improper payments to government
officials.70 After signing the agreement, the employee, who had been
communicating with the Commission, stopped doing so because that
person believed that the separation agreement prohibited such
communications with the Commission and that they could risk being
liable to the company under the agreement for liquidated damages.71
In another instance, in 2016 the Commission announced that
Virginia-based technology company Neustar, Inc., had agreed to settle
charges involving severance agreements that impeded at least one former
employee from communicating with the Commission.72 The order found
NX]; In re BlackRock, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79,804 (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/34-79804.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FU78-5U
P9]; In re SandRidge Energy, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79,607 (Dec. 20, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-79607.pdf [https://perma.cc/NDR2-7Q
SV]; In re NeuStar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79,593 (Dec. 19, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-79593.pdf [https://perma.cc/49NE-AC
UH]; In re Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, Exchange Act Release No. 78,957 (Sept. 28,
2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78957.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG
37-UAJ2]; In re Health Net, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,590 (Aug. 16, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78590.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6XQ-4R
X3]; In re BlueLinx Holdings, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,528 (Aug. 10, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78528.pdf [https://perma.cc/PS8Q-LD
F4]; In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,141
(June 23, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78141.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5JNN-TLHP]; In re KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74,619 (Apr. 1,
2015), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-74619.pdf [https://perma.cc/48
ZL-2N2V].
70. Anheuser-Busch, Exchange Act Release No. 78,957, at 6–7.
71. Id. at 7.
72. NeuStar, Exchange Act Release No. 79,593, at 2–3.
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that Neustar had violated Rule 21F-17 by routinely entering into
severance agreements that contained a broad non-disparagement clause
that forbade former employees from disparaging the company specifically
to the SEC and to other regulators.73 Former employees could be
compelled to forfeit all but $100 of their severance pay for breaching the
clause.74
In the third instance, the Commission announced a settled action
against Seattle-based financial services company HomeStreet for
conducting improper hedge accounting and later taking steps to impede
potential whistleblowers.75 After the SEC contacted the company to seek
documents related to the hedge accounting, HomeStreet presumed it was
in response to a whistleblower complaint and began taking actions to
determine the identity of the whistleblower.76 The company asked an
individual who they presumed was the whistleblower to reaffirm the
denial of their status as a whistleblower on several occasions.77 The
company went so far as to suggest to the presumed whistleblower that the
terms of an indemnification agreement could allow HomeStreet to deny
payment to them for any legal costs they incurred as a witness during the
SEC’s investigation.78 Additionally, HomeStreet was also requiring
former employees to sign severance agreements requiring them to waive
potential whistleblower awards or risk losing their severance payments
and other post-employment benefits.79
We are also on the lookout for instances where agreements
specifically target the Commission’s whistleblower program. These
circumstances arose in the Commission’s actions against BlackRock,
Health Net, and BlueLinx. In all three cases, the companies added
restrictive language that required separating employees to waive any right
to recovery of incentives for reporting misconduct, including under the

73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 3.
In re HomeStreet, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79,844, at 2 (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/34-79844.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AQF-PB
NX].
76. Id. at 7.
77. Id. at 7–8.
78. Id. at 8.
79. Id. at 9.
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SEC’s whistleblower program, to receive their monetary separation
payments from the firm.80
Finally, we are looking at agreements that contain broad restrictive
language that, while it does not single out the SEC’s whistleblower
program, it has the clear effect of precluding participation in the SEC’s
whistleblower regime. These circumstances were present in the
Commission’s actions against KBR, SandRidge Energy, and Merrill
Lynch.
The agreement at issue in KBR required witnesses in certain internal
investigation interviews, including those involving allegations of possible
securities laws violations, to sign confidentiality statements with
language warning that they could face discipline, and even be terminated,
if they discussed the matters with outside parties without the prior
approval of KBR’s legal department.81
The agreements at issue in SandRidge did not permit employees to
voluntarily cooperate with any government agency in connection with
any complaint or investigation of the company.82
The agreements used by Merrill Lynch used language for certain
departing employees that prohibited them from disclosing any aspect of
the confidential information or trade secrets of Merrill Lynch except
pursuant to formal legal process or written company approval.83
To settle these actions, all of the entities agreed to pay penalties and
to take reasonable efforts to contact separated employees who signed the
agreements to inform them that they are not prohibited from providing
80. In re BlackRock, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79,804, at 3 (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/34-79804.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FU78-5U
P9]; In re Health Net, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,590, at 3 (Aug. 16, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78590.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6XQ-4R
X3]; In re BlueLinx Holdings, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78,528, at 4 (Aug. 10,
2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78528.pdf [https://perma.cc/PS
8Q-LDF4].
81. In re KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74,619, at 2 (Apr. 1, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-74619.pdf
[https://perma.cc/48ZL-2N
2V].
82. In re SandRidge Energy, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79,607, at 3 (Dec. 20,
2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-79607.pdf [https://perma.cc/ND
R2-7QSV].
83. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
78,141, at 19 (June 23, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78141.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5JNN-TLHP].
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information to the SEC or from receiving an SEC whistleblower award
for doing so.84
The lessons from these actions are simple. The SEC is not trying to
dictate the language of agreements or warnings—that is the company’s
responsibility—but a company needs to speak clearly in and about
confidentiality provisions so that employees, most of whom are not
attorneys, understand that it is always permissible to report possible
securities laws violations to the SEC.
The final way that the Commission has protected whistleblowers is
by participating as amicus curiae in private retaliation lawsuits. The
Office of the Whistleblower works with the Commission’s Office of
General Counsel to monitor cases in which the defendant, often a former
employer, challenges the Commission’s interpretation of the antiretaliation provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.85
To cite one prominent example, the Commission has filed numerous
amicus briefs in support of whistleblowers in federal district and appellate
courts across the country urging the courts to defer to the Commission’s
Rule that individuals are entitled to employment retaliation protection if
they report information of a possible securities law violation internally at
a publicly traded company regardless of whether they then separately
report that information to the Commission.86
As the SEC has explained in these amicus filings, ensuring that
employees are protected from employment retaliation whenever they
report possible securities laws violations, whether internally or to the
SEC, is critical to the SEC’s enforcement efforts. Put simply, if
individuals are not assured that they will be protected from retaliation if
they report internally, they will be less likely to report internally, which
could undermine the important role that internal compliance programs
play in helping the Commission prevent, detect, and stop securities law
violations.
To date, however, federal courts have reached different conclusions
as to whether an employee who reports violations internally to his or her
84. SandRidge Energy, Exchange Act Release No. 79,607, at 7–8; Merrill Lynch,
Exchange Act Release No. 78,141, at 22–23; KBR, Exchange Act Release No. 74,619, at
4.
85. This discussion pre-dates the Supreme Court’s decision in Dig. Realty Tr., Inc.
v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018). Please review the decision for updated information.
86. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 22.
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company and not to the SEC is covered by the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation
protections.
Most recently, in Somers v. Digital Realty Trust,87 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with a Second Circuit decision88 by
finding that Congress did not intend to limit protections to only those
whistleblowers who report information to the SEC by inserting the word
“whistleblower” in the statutory language.89 Rather, the anti-retaliation
provisions also protect those who are retaliated against after making
internal disclosures and reports of alleged unlawful activity under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other laws, rules, and regulations expressly
cross-referenced in the Dodd-Frank Act.90 The panel agreed with the
Second Circuit that, even if the use of the word “whistleblower” in the
statute created uncertainty, the SEC’s regulation resolved any ambiguity
and is entitled to deference.91
The Fifth Circuit, in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), however, had
previously found to the contrary.92
On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court granted cert. in Somers to
address the scope of Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation protections.93 The
Commission joined an amicus brief filed by the Department of Justice’s
Office of the Solicitor General.94 The brief continues the Commission’s
support and advocacy that whistleblowers who report internally should be
protected from retaliation and defends the Commission’s Rules saying as
much. Oral argument is scheduled for November 28th,95 and we anticipate
a ruling in early 2018.
In closing, the value that whistleblowers add to the SEC’s
enforcement efforts and their ability to protect investors cannot be
overstated, and the Office of the Whistleblower will continue to review
fact patterns of retaliation to protect them.

87. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr. Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 137
S. Ct. 2300 (2017).
88. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015).
89. Somers, 850 F.3d at 1049.
90. Id. at 1050.
91. Id.
92. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 2013).
93. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 137 S. Ct. 2300 (2017).
94. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Somers,
No. 16-1276 (S. Ct. Oct. 17, 2017), 2017 WL 4676666.
95. Transcript of Oral Argument, Somers, No. 16-1276 (S. Ct. Nov. 28, 2017).
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I am proud that the whistleblower program continues to positively
impact the SEC’s enforcement of the federal securities laws, and I am
confident that it will continue to bolster the agency’s mission of the
protection of investors and the markets in the years ahead.
And I am exceedingly grateful for the truly courageous
whistleblowers who step forward to report wrongdoing. They have a
lasting and critical impact on our mission and we truly could not do
without them.
Thank you.
IAN ENGORON: Thank you, Chief Norberg, for that wonderful
keynote address.
Please join me in thanking Chief Norberg for speaking here today.
We will now take a short break and when we return we will hear
from our five terrific panel members.
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PANEL DISCUSSION
IAN ENGORON: Welcome back, everyone. We are going to begin
the panel discussion in a moment, but first I want to introduce our
speakers again.
With us today we have Alice BrightSky, Senior Director of
Compliance Programs here at Fordham Law; Tracey McNeil, a Fordham
alumna, who is the first-ever Ombudsman of the SEC; Jennifer M.
Pacella, Assistant Professor of Law at the Zicklin School of Business;
Judith Weinstock, Assistant Regional Director at the SEC, New York
Regional Office; and Jason Zuckerman, Whistleblower Retaliation &
Award Attorney and Principal of Zuckerman Law.96
As Chief Norberg noted in her keynote address, currently the
Second,97 Fifth,98 and Ninth99 Circuits are split regarding whether or not
the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower protections extend to employees
who report internally to their company rather than directly to the SEC.
Can you please comment on whether or not you think internal
reporters are covered by the Act and why? Ms. Weinstock, would you like
to start us off?
JUDITH WEINSTOCK: Sure. I will certainly echo Jane Norberg’s
comments.
First, I want to thank you for having me here today. I am very pleased
to be here.
I also need to give the same disclaimer that Jane gave: the views I
express are my own, not of the Commission or any of the staff thereof.
However, that being said, my view in this area is, obviously,
consistent with the Commission’s view. As Jane noted, the Commission
has filed numerous amicus briefs in this area,100 and I think that some of
the language in the briefs really tells the story; and I would like to talk a
little bit about the legislative history and why the SEC believes that
internal whistleblowers are included.
There is some language in the SEC’s Ninth Circuit amicus brief in
the Somers case on the rulemaking process that I think is worth noting:

96.
97.
98.
99.

See sources cited supra notes 15–18.
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015).
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr. Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 137
S. Ct. 2300 (2017).
100. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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Throughout the rulemaking process, the Commission considered the
“significant issue” of how to ensure that the whistleblower program
does not undermine the willingness of individuals to make
whistleblower reports internally at their companies before they make
reports to the Commission. The Commission’s final rules were
carefully calibrated to achieve this objective by providing “strong
incentives” for individuals in appropriate circumstances to report
internally in the first instance. The Commission recognized that
internal reporting is not always appropriate, and the decision whether
to do so, either prior to reporting to the Commission or at all, is best
left for whistleblowers to determine based on the particular facts and
circumstances. . . . The Commission also recognized that “reporting
through internal compliance procedures can complement or otherwise
appreciably enhance [its] enforcement efforts in appropriate
circumstances.” “For instance, the subject company may at times be
better able to distinguish between meritorious and frivolous claims
and may make such findings available for the Commission. This
would be particularly true in instances where the reported matter
entails a high level of institutional or company-specific knowledge
and/or the company has a well-functioning internal compliance
program in place. Screening allegations through internal compliance
programs may limit false or frivolous claims, provide the entity an
opportunity to resolve the violation and report the result to the
Commission, and allow the Commission to use its resources more
efficiently.”101

IAN ENGORON: Great.
Perhaps, Mr. Zuckerman, would you like to follow up?
JASON ZUCKERMAN: I agree with what Jane said. Going beyond
the legal arguments, I would ask: why is it that so many large corporations
and all of the lobbyists who advocate on their behalf—who thought that
this SEC reward program is a horrible idea because it is going to
undermine their own ethics programs—why have they fought so hard to
undermine the anti-retaliation aspect of the program? If you go on the
SEC website, you can see the arguments that big business made102—
which I am happy to say did not ultimately prevail—that in order to be
101. Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae in Support of
the Appellee at 3, 10–11, Somers, 850 F.3d 1045 (No. 15-17352), 2016 WL 3088310, at
*4, *11 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
102. Comments on Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of
Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310.shtml [https://perma.cc/TRC3-85Y4]
(last modified Apr. 27, 2015).
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eligible for an award, a whistleblower must show that they blew the
whistle to their employer before blowing the whistle to the SEC. They
fought very hard for that. The SEC ultimately rejected their proposal.
But they argued, again and again: “Look, our employees can raise
concerns internally. We have strong internal ethics programs and antiretaliation policies.” But at the end of the day, this argument is largely
nonsense. They do not want people to speak up.
And now they are arguing in Somers103: “If you speak up and you
suffer retaliation, you do not have any retaliation claim.” Their argument
may backfire because more and more employees will blow the whistle
directly to the SEC, thereby depriving companies of an early warning
about potential fraud.
If the Court holds that Dodd-Frank does not protect internal
whistleblowing, some corporate whistleblowers will still be able to bring
claims under the anti-retaliation provision of SOX.104 Note that when
Congress included an anti-retaliation provision in SOX in 2002, the
Chamber of Commerce and big business opposed it, and when it was
enacted, they tried to narrow SOX protection. Based on my experience
representing whistleblowers, it appears that the instinct of corporate
management is that whistleblowers should not be protected. The core
issue is the flow of information about fraud, i.e., corporate whistleblowers
pose a threat to corporate America because they can reveal the fraud that
would otherwise be kept secret. My sense is that the culture at too many
companies continues to be such that “if there is a violation of the securities
laws, we want to sweep it under the rug, and if you speak out about it, you
are out.”
One of the things that we heard from Ms. Norberg that I think is so
key is that the SEC, to its credit, has made it a high priority to ensure that
whistleblowers can come forward with information about fraud, that
employers cannot stop their employees from blowing the whistle.
Before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, I brought many claims
on behalf of corporate whistleblowers under the anti-retaliation provision
of Sarbanes-Oxley, and in some instances, the employer would sue the
hell out of my client or other corporate whistleblowers. What was the
basis for suing the whistleblower? Because the whistleblower had the gall
to hand over information to the SEC or pursue a SOX retaliation claim.
103.
104.

Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802–04
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012)).
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When my client is unemployed, and likely unemployable, it just
seems absurd that the employer is permitted to further retaliate against my
client by suing to try to dissuade my client from prosecuting their claim.
I do not see as many of those retaliatory lawsuits now, in part because
of the hard work of the SEC in enforcing Rule 21F-17.
Now, I do not want to show any disrespect for people who do work
in ethics and compliance. There are folks who work hard to build strong
ethics programs. My firm is usually not contacted by folks who work at
companies with strong ethics programs. My perspective is based on the
many corporate whistleblowers I hear from who find themselves
unemployed because they spoke out.
IAN ENGORON: On that note—Chief Norberg spoke a good
amount about this in her keynote address—can you please comment on
the legality under Dodd-Frank of using confidentiality agreements,
severance agreements, separation agreements, and other contracts that
employers use to stifle whistleblower efforts; and, additionally, can you
also comment on the legality under Dodd-Frank of physically prohibiting
employees from sending the Commission those types of documents that
might implicate them?
Professor Pacella, would you like to start?
JENNIFER M. PACELLA: Sure. Thank you, and thanks for having
me as well.
As Chief Norberg mentioned, a very active enforcement mechanism
that the SEC is relying on now is its enforcement authority under Rule
21F-17 of Dodd-Frank, which states that employers or any other person
cannot impede an individual from blowing the whistle to the SEC.105
We have been seeing a lot of regulatory action pursuant to this
authority. Rule 21F-17 bars the use of confidentiality agreements to
silence whistleblowers.106 All too commonly, signing one of these
agreements is a condition to employment. The employer requires a
promise by the employee not to report “confidential information,” which
is defined very broadly, and which should not incorporate instances of
wrongdoing, crimes, or fraud.
It is also common that the employee is made to promise to forfeit
bounty rewards.107 All of these actions would fall into what is considered

105.
106.
107.

17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17 (2012).
See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 81–83.
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 80.
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to be unlawful activity that employers cannot take against would-be
whistleblowers pursuant to Rule 21F-17.
I think one issue here that is not spoken about as much under this
particular Rule that I have recently researched is that, while we are aware
that employers cannot stop a whistleblower from contacting the SEC to
orally blow the whistle, how much can they stop whistleblowers from
turning over internal confidential documents to build a strong
documentary case?108 Given the availability of bounty rewards under
Dodd-Frank, the incentive to provide as strong of a case as possible on
the part of the whistleblower may exist but often the whistleblower is
simply concerned about the wrongdoing. They are awake at night about
it, and really just want to build a strong case to inform the SEC about what
has been occurring. I think we need to see more information about this
issue coming through, including more clarity from the SEC.
To date, there has not been any case law, and there is nothing
addressed in the Rule itself as to what extent employers can stop
employee-whistleblowers from turning over to the SEC physical
documentation as they build their cases. But if you were to look to the
SEC’s tips, complaints, and referrals (TCR) system, there are many
opportunities to attach those documents to the SEC, to transmit them over
as part of the whistleblower’s case. I think more attention should be given
to this particular issue to clarify from a regulatory standpoint the extent
to which employers may lawfully stop employee-whistleblowers from
making these transmissions.
IAN ENGORON: Thank you.
Mr. Zuckerman, you look like you are ready to say something.
JASON ZUCKERMAN: I would like to add to that and just give you
some examples of what I see.
When I resolve an employment claim, for example, under SOX,
many employers are smart enough to omit a clause saying “You cannot
speak to the SEC,” but they include other provisions that at the end of the
day have a similar effect.
I had a matter in which the employer demanded that my client affirm
or represent in a settlement agreement that his disclosure was baseless.
The company never offered any evidence that my client’s disclosure was
not well-founded.

108. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Jennifer M. Pacella, Silencing
Whistleblowers by Contract, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming Summer 2018).
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In another matter, the employer tried to add to a settlement
agreement an affidavit that my client would sign denying that he suffered
retaliation. I see this nonsense—trying to silence whistleblowers with de
facto gag provisions—more often than you would believe, including
onerous non-disparagement provisions that threaten draconian sanctions
for saying anything negative about the company.
On the one hand, I do not object to a non-disparagement provision
barring an employee from disparaging their former employer to The New
York Times or The Wall Street Journal. But we need to be careful to
ensure that a non-disparagement provision is not written in a manner that
would deter whistleblowing to the SEC or other regulators.
Let me also note that I try to be careful in advising clients what they
can provide to the SEC. For example, it is a bad idea to turn over a
company laptop to the SEC or for an employee on their way out of the
company to download all their work emails onto a flash drive.
My recommendation to whistleblowers is to ask themselves,
“What is the strongest evidence that you have that would suffice to
persuade the SEC to open an investigation. But make sure it does not
include privileged material.” I am careful to advise clients, “If you have
anything from an in-house lawyer or an outside lawyer, I cannot see it,
and the SEC cannot see it.” And I advise clients to be careful in handling
information that is truly proprietary.
Again, my goal is to do what I can to get the SEC to open up an
investigation and to give the SEC a lot of strong investigative leads and
say, “Here is where the information is.” But I think it is a bad idea for an
employee to take a lot of documents that they do not have access to in the
course of performing their ordinary job duties.
I would also add that it is a terrible idea to access information from
an employer’s network once the employee no longer works for that
employer. Doing so could violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA).109 Once you do not work at the company anymore, you are not
authorized to access their network.
A typical whistleblower client learns about a violation in the course
of performing their ordinary job duties and when they blew the whistle to
their employer, the employer ignored them and now the client is seeking
to report the issue to the SEC.
IAN ENGORON: Okay, great.
109.

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
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Ms. Weinstock?
JUDITH WEINSTOCK: I just wanted to make a point about the
Neustar case,110 which Jane referred to. In the Neustar case, the severance
agreements included a non-disparagement clause.111 A separate provision
of each agreement required the former employee to acknowledge that a
breach of the non-disparagement clause would cause irreparable injury
and damage to Neustar, and it also compelled the former employee to
forfeit all but $100 of any severance compensation paid to the former
employee in the event of such a breach of the disparagement.112 So we
have brought cases in this area.
JASON ZUCKERMAN: When I hear corporate law firms criticize
the SEC for actively enforcing Rule 21F-17 and assert that such
enforcement actions are beyond the scope of the SEC’s jurisdiction or
mandate, I would say that this work is critical because nondisclosure
agreements (NDAs) have been used for too long to conceal information
from shareholders and the SEC. The threat of a lawsuit silences corporate
whistleblowers, thereby putting investors at risk.
The hard work of the SEC in enforcing Rule 21F-17 is having a real
impact. Whenever I settle an employment case now, I usually see a
provision in the agreement clarifying that my client is not waiving the
right to provide information to the SEC.
IAN ENGORON: Great. Thank you.
Can you please comment on the inherent difficulties in developing a
comprehensive and effective program to receive whistleblower
complaints or complaints from retail investors who are having problems
with their employers or the Commission?
Ms. McNeil, would you like to start us off, and maybe help everyone
in the audience understand what an ombudsman does first?
TRACEY McNEIL: Yes.
First, let me give the SEC disclaimer, that the views I express are my
own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Commission, the
Commissioners, or the staff of the Commission.

110. In re NeuStar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79,593 (Dec. 19, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-79593.pdf [https://perma.cc/49NE-AC
UH].
111. Id. at 2–3.
112. Id. at 3.
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It is great to be here. I am a proud alumna of Fordham Law School.
I am dating myself, but I am thankful to Dean Feerick, who was the Dean
of the Law School while I was here, and for Professors Perillo and
Fogelman, who really sparked my interest in contracts and corporations,
which ultimately led me to the securities law field. So, thank you,
Fordham.
I am the first Ombudsman at the SEC.113 Most people ask, “Well,
what is that? How do you spell that? What do you do?”
I was appointed as Ombudsman in September 2014. I have some
fairly broad statutory responsibilities.
First, I serve as a liaison between retail investors and the
Commission and the self-regulatory organizations (SROs) that we
oversee. I am there to act as a liaison to help resolve problems and field
any questions or complaints retail investors may have about the
Commission or SROs.
Second, I work with the Investor Advocate to create processes to
make it easier for retail investors to present questions they may have about
the securities laws.
Third, I maintain the confidentiality of communications between
myself and retail investors.
Fourth, I submit reports to Congress twice a year, included in the
Investor Advocate’s reports to Congress.
So that is what I do in a nutshell.
One of the big issues I address with retail investors, a fundamental
issue that arises in most of the complaints they bring to me, is the gap
between their understanding of what the SEC’s mission means and their
expectations of what the SEC can do for them. The mission of our agency
is to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and
facilitate capital formation.
For retail investors—or, as our Chairman refers to them, “Mr. and
Ms. 401(k)”114—they are really focused on that protect investors piece of
our mission statement.
The news that I have to deliver to them on a daily basis is what that
really means. When the SEC says “we protect investors,” it does not
mean, as a lot of investors and other persons say to me, “The SEC will
give me my money back” or “I have figured out the problem. Here it is.
SEC, now what are you going to do to get my money back? What is the
113.
114.

Biography: Tracey L. McNeil, supra note 16.
See Clayton, supra note 22.
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status of my investigation? Did you launch an investigation on my
behalf?”
I am giving you those examples because one of the most important
things I have to do as Ombudsman is listen to complaints as they come
in, fresh from the investor’s point of view. I have to say to myself, “I may
have been a person who would bring a similar complaint if I did not know
what I know. If I had not been to Fordham Law School, and Shearman &
Sterling, and the SEC, I might formulate my questions or complaints that
same way.”
So every day—and I would encourage you all, too, if you get into
this field—you have to have two trains of thought. You are the expert.
You always have more to learn, but you are the expert. But then, likewise,
you have to take people where they are at the time and really listen to
what they have to say. That was a challenge early on, because I had to
train myself and train my team to exercise a different set of muscles when
listening to retail investors.
I have been the Ombudsman now under two different chairpersons,
both interested in the details of what I hear from investors. I have to make
certain that I am presenting investors’ complaints and concerns in a way
that is meaningful to our leadership and that adds value to the work of the
agency.
One important thing I did from the beginning was to not bean-count
for the sake of the numbers only. I am at a federal agency, so I do count
things, and I do track my numbers and statistics.
But I did not want to put myself in a position of having to justify the
value of what I do solely by the number of people that I communicate
with, because talking to one person about one issue can change the world
for that person, for their family, for the industry. Although I am really
proud to say that in these three years, my small team and I have fielded
more than 3,500 contacts and complaints from investors, I do not equate
the value of what I do solely with the number of investors who contact
me.
One important tool that I recently launched to the public is what we
are calling our “Ombudsman Matter Management System.” That was a
working title that happened to stick, so people are also calling it OMMS.
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If you go to sec.gov/ombudsman, there is a button for OMMS and
the user-friendly electronic form that anyone can fill out,115 even on a
mobile device. Any questions or comments that you may have about the
Commission or SROs or our relationship to them, or the types of resources
the SEC can provide; or if you just have a problem and you do not know
where to go at the SEC; or you have a problem and you contacted several
offices at the SEC and you have not heard anything yet—if you go to
sec.gov/ombudsman and fill out the OMMS form, it comes directly to me
and I am there to help you figure out where to go and the options that are
available to you.
Thanks.
IAN ENGORON: Ms. Weinstock?
JUDITH WEINSTOCK: I would just add that there are a lot of
different options at the SEC. Tracey’s work is complemented by, as Jane
mentioned, our Office of Market Intelligence, where you can submit a tip,
complaint, or referral.116 We also have the Office of Investor Education
and Advocacy, and if you look at their website, their mission statement is
they can help you invest wisely and avoid fraud,117 so they put out a lot of
investor alerts.118
But you can file a complaint or you can ask a question. In the New
York Regional Office, among other things, I supervise our investor
assistance specialist. I can tell you firsthand that we get questions in the
New York office—questions about brokers, for example, people’s
brokerage accounts and we, to the extent that we can, respond to those.
We respond to every single one that comes to New York. Sometimes we
are writing a letter to the broker/dealer; sometimes we are just answering
a question, we are referring someone to another agency; but we do have
that hands-on approach at the SEC.
IAN ENGORON: Great. All right.
How do you think that the relationship between corporations, and
specifically their compliance departments, and the SEC would be affected
115. Ombudsman Matter Management System (OMMS) Submission Form, U.S. SEC.
& EXCH. COMMISSION, https://secir.secure.force.com/ombudsman/ [https://perma.cc/H5
V4-29HX] (last visited Dec. 21, 2017).
116. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
117. The SEC’s Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMMISSION (Feb. 16, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/
investor-pubs-aboutoieahtm.html [https://perma.cc/656Q-PRZQ].
118. Investor Alerts and Bulletins, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION, https://www.sec.
gov/investor/alerts [https://perma.cc/X7AJ-5ZF7] (last visited Dec. 21, 2017).
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if employees were required under Dodd-Frank to actually report directly
to the SEC, as opposed to being allowed to report internally?
Ms. BrightSky, would you like to start us off?
ALICE BRIGHTSKY: Sure. I think, in a word, “strained” would be
my answer.
Let me back up for a second. I think you may have picked up on a
theme here. There are two really sort of key components to a
whistleblowing program: one is having the controls available—so I am
talking from the perspective of a corporation or a financial institution—
for employees to escalate their concerns anonymously or otherwise; but
also having the control environment, which I will use the word “culture”
as a proxy for, that is supportive of enabling employees to raise their
concerns.
I think what we have been talking about, especially as we delve into
the anti-retaliation provisions and we think about the pending Supreme
Court decision on Digital Realty, is that we really are talking about issues
of culture, to my mind, issues of the control environment.
Why is it that corporations take such a defensive posture and craft
these types of NDAs and severance agreements that we have been talking
about? I think this is an issue of culture.
Compliance departments and ethics groups are there to sort of help
right the ship. I think we take it as one of our charges—especially now in
post-Yates memo119 and personal liability environment—we really take it
as part of our mandate and charge not to just be there to protect the
organization, but we have the public interest at heart as well. So we are
all sort of marching to what I consider the common policy objective of
rooting out misconduct, identifying and escalating it, and hopefully
deterring it in the future.
So, when I think about what mandating employees reporting directly
to the Commission means to compliance programs, I think it would be
unfortunate, because I think there is a lot of opportunity for collaboration
here.
119. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice to Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Div.,
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Div., Assistant Attorney Gen., Env’t & Nat. Res.
Div., Assistant Attorney Gen., Nat’l Sec. Div., Assistant Attorney Gen., Tax Div., Dir.,
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Dir., Exec. Office for U.S. Trs., and all U.S. Attorneys
(Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [https://
perma.cc/PG8A-BY49].
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I actually think that the balance of the incentives that are written into
the Rules right now strike a fairly good balance.
There is incentivization for the employee to first go through their
internal control structure. They can do that and have a 120-day grace
period before actually reporting to the Commission, and they still hold
their line and avail themselves of the award.120 They get credit for the
additional information that is uncovered as a result of the organization’s
investigation.
So, in a sense, you have this opportunity to really deploy all of the
internal resources of the organization, specifically the risk management
function and the compliance function, and, if they are doing their jobs
right, that should be to the benefit of everybody involved.
Now, actually executing on that and turning the tide of culture and
getting our corporations to be more supportive of this, I think the SEC
program is doing a good job of incentivizing that, and I think the two
working collaboratively is the best way forward.
So my answer to that question would be I would not want to see
employees pressured to only report through the Commission. A statistic
that supports that opinion is that, despite all of the retaliation, eighty
percent or something thereabouts—I think there was a survey put out by
the Ethics Resource Center that stated that eighty percent of
whistleblowers actually first attempt to escalate their concerns
internally,121 and that is in the poor cultural environment that we have
been talking about. So what is going to happen when those cultural
environments improve, those control environments improve? I think we
can only go up from here.
So that is my answer.
JASON ZUCKERMAN: Just to pull something out of the headlines,
look at what happened to Harvey Weinstein.122 How the heck did he get
away with it all those years? Those were not small acts of harassment. If
half of the allegations are true, this guy should be locked up for the rest
of his life.
120.
121.

17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c)(3) (2012).
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODDFRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 16 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/files/owb-annualreport-2014_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XBZ-V68M].
122. Harvey Weinstein Timeline: How the Scandal Unfolded, BBC NEWS (Dec. 20,
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-41594672 [https://perma.cc/FEM8SPN4].
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How did it go on for so long? How did it go on for so long with
Ailes?123 How is it that these powerful people are able to get away with it,
and are not held accountable? It is because people are afraid to report the
misconduct.
The Ethics Resource Center did a survey in 2013 in which they found
that approximately forty-one percent of employees observed some form
of misconduct in the workplace, and approximately thirty-three percent
did not say anything about it.124 They remained completely silent.
I agree with Ms. BrightSky, that if employers prevail in the Somers
case at the Supreme Court, employees are more likely to blow the whistle
directly to the SEC rather than to corporate compliance.
Why did more people not speak out about Ailes, or about Harvey
Weinstein? That is an issue that every employer should consider, i.e., do
we have an environment in which employees feel comfortable speaking
up?
But unfortunately, some folks have risen to the top of corporations
because they have a certain personality type, folks who believe, “I built
this entity, and if you are going to speak out and say I have done anything
wrong, you are out.” I see that in a lot of the cases I bring, where a client
blew the whistle about a senior company official’s misconduct, and doing
so doomed their career at that company.
So we should look beyond just whether employees are blowing the
whistle internally or alternatively, to the SEC. Instead, the question
should be whether they will speak out at all; and if they are not reporting
misconduct, who is harmed by failing to bring the misconduct to light?
People who knew what Harvey Weinstein was up to—and there are a lot
of them125—and did not say anything, did not intervene—because
Weinstein is powerful—essentially allowed or enabled Weinstein to
continue harassing women.
IAN ENGORON: Thank you.

123. Jill Disis & Frank Pallotta, The Last Year of Roger Ailes’ Life was Consumed by
Scandal, CNN MONEY (May 18, 2017, 11:37 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/18/
media/timeline-roger-ailes-last-year/index.html [https://perma.cc/GU6X-M7PG].
124. ETHICS RES. CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY OF THE U.S.
WORKFORCE 14 (2013), https://www.ibe.org.uk/userassets/surveys/nbes2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T3HS-EEUX].
125. Megan Twohey et al., Weinstein’s Complicity Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/05/us/harvey-weinstein-compli
city.html [https://perma.cc/Z68J-HYBL].
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How do you think whistleblower awards either encourage or
discourage employees to blow the whistle on corporate fraud? Is the SEC
whistleblower award program encouraging action, or is it perhaps
providing a perverse incentive to wait until the fraud grows larger and
therefore the reward grows larger?
Mr. Zuckerman, I will let you continue.
JASON ZUCKERMAN: One, if I speak to a prospective client who
is aware of a violation, I try to act quickly to help the client report the
fraud or other wrongdoing. (A) I want to get to the SEC before anyone
else who knows about the fraud gets to the SEC so that my client will be
eligible for an award; and (B) if my client were to delay reporting fraud,
he or she will be asked by the SEC—as almost all of my clients who I
have brought to the SEC have been asked—”When did you first become
aware of the violation and why did you not report it then?”
And, if you look at all of the orders issued by the SEC Office of the
Whistleblower, there are several instances where the whistleblower award
was lowered because of a delay in reporting the fraud.
So I do not buy this argument that an employee who is aware of a
violation is likely to delay reporting in an effort to get a higher award.
To your earlier issue—which is why do employees report? When my
clients call me, it really is because they brought up an issue, they saw
something that was wrong, they went to the employer in the hopes that it
would be acted upon; it was not acted upon, and that is why they are
considering reporting the violation to the SEC. They want to see that their
issue will be addressed and feel that they have an ethical duty to blow the
whistle.
For a lot of my clients it is very helpful that there is the incentive of
potentially recovering an award, especially because of the risk of
retaliation and blacklisting, but I do not think that the reward is the sole
reason why they blow the whistle.
So you might ask, why do they need to have an award? The award is
very helpful because they have to put a lot on the line when they come
forward.
My typical client is in a high-level position in the midpoint of their
professional career, and they worked really hard in order to get to that
level and there are not many comparable job opportunities. Where a
whistleblower client is a corporate officer, he or she is not likely to just
move to another C-suite position at another company. That client might
never again have a position at that level and never earn as much. If you
compare what they would earn if they look the other way and keep their
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senior level position long-term, that is usually far greater than the value
of a whistleblower award.
What happens to some of my clients when they speak out is that word
spreads about their whistleblowing and it gets very difficult to get
reemployed in a particular industry. But it is very hard to prove that an
employer did not hire you because of your whistleblowing at a prior
employer. That is why I think it is important to offer whistleblowers a
financial incentive.
IAN ENGORON: Professor Pacella, in answering the question, if
you might also comment on an area that Mr. Zuckerman just touched on,
why someone might blow the whistle besides the award, what might
encourage someone to do that.
JENNIFER M. PACELLA: I definitely agree with what was just
mentioned.
There have been empirical studies done to show that the underlying
motivation of whistleblowers is not necessarily a financial incentive.126
Rather, very loyal employees who are extremely concerned about
wrongdoing going on in the workplace and want to alert upper
management to those concerns are motivated to report on their own. So,
I do feel that, even without the financial incentive of the bounty program,
whistleblowing would still take place.
I absolutely agree, though, that it is a positive development that the
statute offers bounties and that it is beneficial to offset the negative effects
of whistleblowing, as most whistleblowers unfortunately face a terrible
fate, either having been terminated from employment, suffering from a
loss of promotion, or facing harassment in their offices after making a
report—it is common that they experience a real loss of livelihood from
blowing the whistle.
I have personally spoken with many whistleblowers who have
expressed that they are just out of their industry forever and have to turn
to alternative employment options due to a stigma they experience in their
field. They may have children, homes to pay for, etc. and the bounty
program helps to offset those concerns and costs that they might incur
126. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88
TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1200–03 (2010); Adam Waytz, Whistleblowers are Motivated by
Moral Reasons Above Monetary Ones, U. CHI. BOOTH SCH. BUS. STIGLER CTR.:
PROMARKET (Aug. 30, 2016), https://promarket.org/whistleblowers-motivated-moralreasons-monetary-ones/ [https://perma.cc/G78Z-2NQY].
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from whistleblowing. For that reason, I do not think that bounty rewards
are a perverse incentive at all.
I also think it is important to remember that the SEC does have
limitations as to who can receive a bounty reward. I often get asked, “Will
people just engage in wrongdoing themselves and then bring all of this
valuable inside information to the SEC just to receive a bounty reward?”
Well, it is important to remember that the SEC will not give a bounty
to anyone who has been convicted of a criminal violation associated with
that underlying action.127 So, it is limited as to eligibility. Congress,
through the statute, has implemented these restrictions on eligibility for
bounties, so I do not think it has the effect of encouraging wrongdoing
merely to be eligible for a reward.
I think, at the end of the day, most whistleblowers are really just loyal
employees concerned about wrongdoing that they are seeing take place
and they want to do something to stop it.
And, of course, too, I think some may have a fear of personal liability
as well, that if the wrongdoing goes on and they do not speak up about it,
will they be personally liable somehow?
IAN ENGORON: All right. Great.
This next question will largely depend upon how the Supreme Court
comes down on the Somers case coming November 28th: how do you
think whistleblower awards impact the worker compliance departments?
Although SEC rules provide that a whistleblower may be subject to an
increased award for reporting to and assisting internal compliance
departments, employees may feel a lot less intimidated going directly to
the SEC and not facing a lot of those retaliations that we have been talking
about the whole day.
Ms. Weinstock, would you maybe want to start us off?
JUDITH WEINSTOCK: I think that some people may prefer to go
to their employer because, as has been noted in some of the case law, they
may think that reporting only to their employer offers the prospect of
having the wrongdoing ended with little chance of retaliation, whereas
reporting to a government agency creates substantial risk of retaliation.
But I hope that whistleblower awards create incentives for
employees to self-report to their compliance departments and for
companies to remediate.
At the end of the day, we want companies to do the right thing. But
to the extent that companies may not be motivated to do the right thing on
127.

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(c)(3) (2012).
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their own, we hope that knowing that employees have the power and the
incentive to go to the SEC provides the company with a financial
incentive to remediate or to doing the right thing in the first place.
IAN ENGORON: Ms. BrightSky, how do whistleblower awards
impact the work of compliance departments?
ALICE BRIGHTSKY: I think I will echo that somewhat. I have four
categories here in terms of how I think about this question.
I think the whistleblower awards, first and foremost to my mind,
incentivize compliance departments to establish stronger internal
controls, so I think that is a good thing.
It has been proffered in a few white papers,128 and certainly in the
arguments that I think Mr. Zuckerman referred to in the comment period
on the rulemaking,129 that the awards program creates this competition
between compliance departments and the SEC in terms of vying for that
reporting mechanism.
I do not think that is the case, and I do not think the statistics or the
reality support that as the case. As we have already said, the reality in the
worst-case scenario, where the culture is really not one that is supportive
of whistleblowing, even in those cases, whistleblowers tend to report
internally first.
Now, to my mind, we are moving in the direction, and compliance
departments are moving in the direction, of being much more supportive,
and really compliance officers now have to face personal liability as well
if their programs are failing, and that includes whistleblower programs
being key internal controls for them. So I think everyone is mutually
incentivized to make this work and to support whistleblowing.
The long and short of it is that I think it incentivizes compliance
programs.
IAN ENGORON: Professor Pacella, would you like to add anything?
JENNIFER M. PACELLA: I absolutely agree with that.

128. See, e.g., COURTNEY BOECKMAN, CONVERCENT, HOW TO INCENTIVIZE
WHISTLEBLOWERS TO FIRST USE INTERNAL REPORTING TOOLS (2015),
https://www.convercent.com/resource/convercent-white-paper-how-to-incentivizewhistleblowers-to-first-use-internal-reporting-tools.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ6E-6Q4E].
129. See, e.g., Letter from Jones Day to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 17, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310185.pdf [https://perma.cc/WW4M-R8W5].
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One of the arguments I regularly make in my research is that
whistleblowers are key players in compliance.130 I would even define
them as “internal reporters.” As has been established, most are reporting
on the inside, “up-the-ladder,” often all the way to the board of
directors.131
When you have this kind of internal reporting, you are able to catch
red flags and problems in their earliest stages, ideally. At that point, upper
management has a decision to make: will they utilize some sort of
resource to look into this and further investigate? They should.
It would be to their benefit, from a compliance standpoint, to then
make the decision to self-report to the SEC or to a government agency if
violations are uncovered because that would eventually lead to more
cooperation and potential leniency for rectifying the problem.
So I always make the argument that an internal whistleblower is a
key player in compliance. Hopefully, times are changing a bit to recognize
that. I definitely agree it has been traditionally a corporate culture
problem, and a lot of times people do not want to hear what is bad news,
right? If we could succeed at changing the tone at the top and the corporate
culture to encourage and value whistleblowers, then I think that in the
next generation of business managers, hopefully people will view
whistleblowers as very beneficial members of the entity.
ALICE BRIGHTSKY: Can I just interject one other thing? From my
personal experience as an anti-money laundering (AML) compliance
officer, if you appreciate the nuanced differences between monitoring for
AML program violations versus monitoring for everything else in a
compliance program, you have looking at your customers and being
suspicious of what they are doing through your institution versus looking
at your employees and being potentially suspicious of what they are doing
to put the consumers marketplace and business at risk.
We are starting to see a trend of really talking about this nexus now
between AML and conduct risk. The way it sort of operates in practice

130. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Pacella, Conflicted Counselors: Retaliation Protections for
Attorney-Whistleblowers in an Inconsistent Regulatory Regime, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 491,
492–93 (2016) [hereinafter Pacella, Conflicted Counselors]; Jennifer M. Pacella, The
Cybersecurity Threat: Compliance and the Role of Whistleblowers, 11 BROOK. J. CORP.,
FIN. & COM. L. 39, 40 (2016).
131. Pacella, Conflicted Counselors, supra note 130, at 494.
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today is that a lot of times there is not a lot of synergy or communication
between those two somewhat siloed areas of risk in an organization.
But if you look at the recent enforcement actions—or not even
recent; go back to Riggs Bank132 or go back to Bank of New York and
Lucy Edwards, an insider who helped orchestrate a money laundering
scheme through the institution133—you recognize that a lot of the biggest,
most egregious incidents of money laundering involved insiders.
If we can channel internal reporting and really support it, we may get
an early warning mechanism in place for these other areas of risk, which
could be really priceless and stave off some of these bigger violations,
and, more importantly, stop the illicit activity from occurring.
So from an AML perspective I want to see this succeed, and I want
compliance programs to really work on this and to see this as a
collaborative effort and help turn the tide of corporate culture so that it is
more supportive of whistleblowers.
JASON ZUCKERMAN: One of the ways I think the SEC program
has had a real impact is that I see more often that employers know they
cannot ignore a compliance issue; they need to investigate it and write a
report.
For example, I have had some clients who were fired for blowing the
whistle internally and I was able to resolve their matters before initiating
litigation. But as part of a settlement in some of those matters, the
employer required that my client agree to be interviewed about their
disclosures, which I think is good for both parties. Even though my client
is not pursuing a retaliation claim, the employer knows that the issue
cannot be ignored and could potentially come before the SEC and
therefore they need to be in a position to show that they investigated the
issue.
Ideally, employees would not need to contact an anonymous ethics
hotline to blow the whistle. Employees should feel comfortable raising
concerns directly with their supervisory chain.
IAN ENGORON: Okay. Thank you for all those great answers.

132. Eric Dash, Riggs Bank is Penalized $16 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/27/business/riggs-bank-is-penalized-16-million.html
[https://perma.cc/AD36-P4VN].
133. Timothy L. O’Brien & Raymond Bonner, Banker and Husband Tell of Role in
Laundering Case, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/17/
world/banker-and-husband-tell-of-role-in-laundering-case.html [https://perma.cc/R232ZY27].
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Next question: Why might someone choose to file a whistleblower
complaint under Sarbanes-Oxley rather than Dodd-Frank?
Professor Pacella?
JENNIFER M. PACELLA: I would be happy to answer that, sure.
There are many differences between the whistleblower protection
programs under Sarbanes-Oxley and under Dodd-Frank. Many people
argue that Dodd-Frank is a better program because it allows the
whistleblower the right to bring a cause of action to federal court
directly,134 whereas under Sarbanes-Oxley a whistleblower must file an
administrative remedy with the Secretary of Labor through the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA).135
The statute of limitations is much longer under Dodd-Frank; it is six
years as opposed to six months under Sarbanes-Oxley.136 Therefore, many
people have argued that Dodd-Frank is a better program—not to mention
it has the bounty reward program as well, which is separate from its
retaliation protections, of course.
Sarbanes-Oxley offers to whistleblowers relief such as reinstatement
of your employment if you are successful in your retaliation claim, as well
as back pay. Dodd-Frank offers the same things; it actually offers double
back pay; so that is a further benefit to Dodd-Frank.137
But one reason, in thinking about this further, that a whistleblower
might opt to utilize Sarbanes-Oxley is for compensation for special
damages as well.138 That would be anything that would make the
whistleblower whole. Courts have looked at this provision and found that
this would allow whistleblowers to receive damages for noneconomic
harms, so that would include pain and suffering.139 Often, that kind of
relief pinpoints the exact problem that the whistleblower has suffered.
You cannot put a monetary number on that because of all these reasons
we mentioned—retaliation, loss of livelihood, inability to get a new job,
etc.
Dodd-Frank, although it offers a bounty reward and double back pay,
actually does not offer those types of special damages that could amount
to more compensation at the end of the day for the whistleblower. That
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

2014).

See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) (2012).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1) (2012).
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii) with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D).
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii) with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(C).
See, e.g., Halliburton, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., 771 F.3d 254, 266 (5th Cir.
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may be one reason that a whistleblower might opt to pursue a remedy
under Sarbanes-Oxley.
IAN ENGORON: I believe that the Department of Labor, the
Secretary of Labor, covers the cost of the litigation as well, correct?
JENNIFER M. PACELLA: Yes. There is a provision in the statute
that the whistleblower may be reimbursed for litigation costs and
attorney’s fees as well.140 Dodd-Frank offers that, too,141 but the difference
is the special damages clause.
JASON ZUCKERMAN: Can I add a few things to that?
The Dodd-Frank Act amended Section 806 of SOX to clarify that
SOX claims are exempt from mandatory arbitration agreements.142 Oddly
enough, that same provision was not included in the anti-retaliation
provision of the Dodd-Frank Act.143
If you are on the plaintiff side, generally you want to avoid
arbitration. Discovery is limited, and the proceeding is confidential. Also,
the fact that the employer is often paying a lot of the arbitrator’s fee can
influence the outcome. Therefore, I would prefer to bring a SOX claim to
avoid arbitration.
Another advantage of pursuing a SOX claim is that the
whistleblower is likely to get a hearing on the merits, especially where the
claim is prosecuted at the Office of Administrative Law Judges at the
Department of Labor. In contrast, prosecuting the claim in federal court
increases the risk of dismissal on summary judgment. Some federal
judges go out of their way to dismiss employment claims on summary
judgment. That is a bit of a bold statement, but there is a lot of research
on it.144
I will not go into other nuances, but in order to prove the main
element of a SOX claim—i.e., that you blew the whistle—you just have
to show that you had a reasonable belief that there was a violation of an
SEC rule or one of the other categories of SOX protected disclosures.145
140.
141.
142.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(C).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(iii).
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 922(c)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)).
143. Id. § 922(a), 124 Stat. at 1841–48 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78u-6).
144. See, e.g., Kerri Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination Law, 56
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 111, 112 (2011); Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy
Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on
Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 95 (2010).
145. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).
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A SOX retaliation plaintiff need not prove that they blew the whistle on
an actual violation. That is a helpful standard that makes it harder for
employers to prevail on a motion for summary judgment.
By the way, why should the standard be “reasonable belief” as
opposed to proving an actual violation? Because Section 806 of SOX is a
prophylactic statute—the goal is to encourage employees to report early
on, before there is actual harm to shareholders.
IAN ENGORON: Ms. Weinstock, the SEC is the agency that
administers the Dodd-Frank Act, so you might be a little biased, but why
would someone choose to file a complaint under Dodd-Frank as opposed
to SOX?
JUDITH WEINSTOCK: I think the panel has basically covered this.
I guess one of the things to think about is, are you bringing a private
action in federal court or are you bringing something to the SEC? You do
not actually—I am sorry to say this in front of my colleague—need an
attorney to file a whistleblower claim through the SEC. That is something
that you can do on your own.
One advantage to getting an attorney and filing a whistleblower
complaint with the SEC is that you can file it anonymously. So you file it
anonymously through your attorney and all we see as the SEC is the
attorney’s name on it. That is something that the person—they can keep
themselves anonymous pretty much forever, unless and until the award
process comes through, and that is really something that is up to them.
If the SEC successfully brings a case and it is over $1 million, there
may come a time when the whistleblower has to identify themselves to
actually get paid, but, other than that, they can choose to be anonymous
the whole time.
There may be a decision to make for that person along the way,
because if you remain anonymous, you may in some way be less helpful
to the SEC, but that is something that is available to that person. They can
remain anonymous throughout the process.
IAN ENGORON: Great.
This was one of the questions posed to Chief Norberg, but I would
like to hear all of your insights on it: how does and how can the SEC or a
corporation encourage legitimate complaints, and in what ways can the
SEC or corporations investigate these complaints to make sure that they
are legitimate and not from disgruntled employees, or investors in the case
of the Ombudsman’s Office?
If you would like to lead us?
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TRACEY McNEIL: I do have some thoughts about how the SEC can
encourage complaints. I will leave it to my colleague to talk about how
we investigate complaints.
As far as encouraging complaints, being in a new role at the SEC, I
get to hear a lot from investors about what they do not like about the SEC.
So one of the things that I let them know is that I follow three common
standards of practice across the ombudsman field, and those are the
standards of confidentiality, informality, and independence.
When they come to me, by statute I have to maintain the
confidentiality of our communications.146 So immediately, investors or
potential whistleblowers or just an interested person who has an issue,
knowing that it is confidential helps set a different tone. They are talking
to me, I am at the regulator, but I have this responsibility to keep our
communications, in most instances, confidential, unless the investor tells
me otherwise.
The informal aspect of my standards of practice can cut both ways,
depending upon what the person wants from me. For example, I am not
an office of notice. So again, when they are talking to me in this informal
capacity, while I cannot take formal legal action or give them
personalized legal or financial advice, I am able to have a broad, and I
feel, a more relaxed and intuitive, conversation with them about their
issues and concerns.
Once they understand what I am there to do and we establish a
rapport, investors tell me a lot of things, some things that, depending upon
the circumstances, are really tough to hear. What I am doing in those
moments is not just establishing trust so that they tell me the whole story
from their perspective and understanding, but I am also listening to their
issues as a person with securities law expertise.
I am also going through questions and scenarios in my head: is the
investor ticking off some elements of a securities law violation? Is there
something in, for example, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s
(FINRA’s) SRO rules that this investor is not aware of that I should
clarify? Do I need to end this call and contact our Office of Market
Intelligence? Is the investor a potential fraud victim?
Most investors who call me, after we have established trust and
rapport, may then say, “Oh, sure, you can talk to the Division of
Enforcement about my issue, or you can give them my information and
they can reach out to me.” So, in that way, there have been several
146.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(g)(8)(B)(iii).
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occasions that I am glad I was there as the Ombudsman to facilitate that
level of trust and communication.
As for the third standard of practice, independence, I sit in the Office
of the Investor Advocate at the SEC.
The Office of the Investor Advocate was specifically designed to be
somewhat independent147— so we do have a certain measure of
independence in being able to do the work that we feel is necessary to
fulfill our statutory mandate.
One example of that independence is, since it is congressional report
season for me, unlike a lot of other offices and divisions at the agency, we
do not have to have our reports reviewed or approved by the Commission
before they go to Congress.148
I am usually not the last stop for investors. But I do feel that I add
value in helping investors navigate when they do not know where to go
at the SEC. They can call me. I can say, “Here you go. There is a real
person that you can contact there, or give me your information and I will
go talk to that person and call you back.”
I keep saying “real person” because on one of my very first calls as
Ombudsman, an investor called, and I answered, “Tracey McNeil.”
He said, “I want to speak to the Ombudsman.”
I said, “Tracey McNeil. I am the Ombudsman.”
He said, “I want to speak to the Ombudsman.”
I said, “I am Tracey McNeil. I am the Ombudsman.”
He said, “Oh, you are a real person!”
I said, “Yes, I am. I believe so.”
That call was a great learning experience as Ombudsman, because it
pointed out a fundamental customer service and investor experience gap
that I am able to fill. So now I am the Ombudsman, a real person at the
SEC here to help retail investors. I am proud to be a member of the staff
of the agency, and I feel that my colleagues and I are dedicated to doing
our very best to fulfill the agency’s mission.
So, for my role, I hope that investors understand that they do have a
measure of confidentiality, that when they are talking to me it is
informal—that they can talk to me and I am going to do my best to try to
get them the information or resources they need.
147. Office of the Investor Advocate, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/page/investor-advocate-landing-page [https://perma.cc/3HKH-2K
RF] (last modified Feb. 8, 2017).
148. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(g)(6)(B)(iii).
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As the Ombudsman is a new role and resource at the agency, I feel I
am providing a needed service by helping investors and other persons feel
more comfortable in coming to us with information, questions, and
concerns.
IAN ENGORON: Ms. Weinstock and then Mr. Zuckerman.
JUDITH WEINSTOCK: A couple of things.
Whistleblowers have to voluntarily provide the SEC with original
information that leads to a successful enforcement action yielding
monetary sanctions of over a million dollars in order to get an award.149
With respect to how do we encourage people to bring meritorious claims,
well, to the extent that people are motivated by the financial incentives,
they are not going to get that award unless we can successfully bring a
case. So it may just be a waste of someone’s time to bring something
frivolous to us.
In terms of original information, I think, as Jason mentioned, there is
an incentive to come forward early because you have to come forward
with original information, which is any information that the SEC does not
already have.150 The investigation can be open already, but if the
information leads us to different conduct, or even if the information
significantly contributed to bringing the matter, that also can be eligible
for an award.151
Our prior Enforcement Director, Andrew Ceresney, had encouraged
prompt reporting in a speech that he made. He said, “My general message
to whistleblowers is to report as soon as you learn of misconduct, as you
never know whether someone else will report, whether the information
will become stale, or whether the statute of limitations will run.”152
But, in terms of how to investigate these complaints, I am not sure
that these whistleblower complaints are really any different from a nonwhistleblower complaint. Whenever you have a witness in a case—now,
obviously, it tends to be helpful to have a whistleblower, to have an
insider, to have a witness—I mean that is invaluable, as Jane mentioned—
but whenever you have a witness in a case, everything that he or she says
149.
150.
151.
152.

See id. § 78u-6(b)(1).
See id. § 78u-6(a)(3).
See id.
Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the
Sixteenth Annual Taxpayers Against Fraud Conference in Washington, D.C.: The SEC’s
Whistleblower Program: The Successful Early Years (Sept. 14, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ceresney-sec-whistleblower-program.html
[https://perma.cc/ATF4-WG24].
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has to be corroborated. Can you prove the case without this person’s
information? Can you corroborate it? Can you back it up?
You do not necessarily want to be in a situation—although we have
certainly brought cases before reliant on one person’s word, but
realistically we are talking about corporate fraud; we are talking about
fraud that involves documents. There should be some documents that
relate to this situation and you should be able to corroborate what the
person is telling you with those documents. Are there emails that support
it?
And, as Jason mentioned, you are going to make a credibility
determination. You are going to ask these questions: did they delay in
reporting? Did they participate in the conduct? Are there other witnesses?
These are all questions that you would want to ask in any case. We really
encourage whistleblowers to come forward because we really want that
help.
But, in terms of the way we investigate it—and the whistleblower
may bring us something that is difficult to understand. That is always
really helpful, but you still have to do a fulsome investigation in many of
the same ways you would do in another case. You have to corroborate
what the witness is saying, you have to make a credibility determination,
and you really have to be able to prove the case.
We like to try to prove the case in multiple ways. Now, I am not
saying you could never do it based on one witness, but, again, you are
talking about the corporate fraud area and there should be some other
evidence to corroborate what the person is saying.
JASON ZUCKERMAN: So just a few observations really quickly.
My concern is the opposite, i.e., that due to a lack of resources, they
cannot act on certain tips. The risk of overlooking credible tips about
ongoing fraud schemes will increase due to a hiring freeze.153
Eighteen thousand people have provided information to the SEC
Office of the Whistleblower.154 Less than one hundred received an
award.155 So, even if it that number was one hundred, look at those odds.
153. Matt Robinson & Benjamin Bain, Wall Street Penalties Have Fallen in Trump’s
First Year, Study Says, BLOOMBERG: POL. (Nov. 11, 2017, 11:36 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-14/wall-street-penalties-fall-intrump-s-first-year-study-shows [https://perma.cc/MB3P-CP54].
154. Carmen Germaine, SEC Whistleblower Program Is Business As Usual, Chief
Says, LAW360 (June 28, 2017, 9:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/939700/secwhistleblower-program-is-business-as-usual-chief-says [https://perma.cc/7UQF-V84U].
155. Id.
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The SEC will investigate a whistleblower disclosure only if it is very
strong.
Number two, I think it would be helpful for the SEC to work more
collaboratively with whistleblowers on an ongoing basis. Some of the
schemes the SEC investigates are very complex, and the whistleblower
could offer important insights into the documents and other evidence.
In some matters I have at the SEC, the staff has some ongoing
interaction with the whistleblower, but usually the staff says: “We cannot
say anything about an ongoing investigation.”
JUDITH WEINSTOCK: I just would say that our investigations are
confidential and nonpublic, and so we are prevented from giving that
information. We spend a lot of time in the New York Office and
elsewhere within the SEC telling people that, sending people letters
saying that.
I think that in terms of—it sounds like you tell your clients, “Okay,
the SEC is calling us; that is a good sign.” When we are continuing to
work with someone, we cannot really tell them anything. But I could see
how a private attorney would tell their client, “Yeah, that is a good sign,”
because obviously we are gathering more information, we at least have a
preliminary interest in the matter.
But I think that everybody—we have a lot of different staff
attorneys—conducts their investigations in different ways. Each
investigation is different and it calls for different methods. That might
mean a year poring over documents.
Can it be helpful sometimes to have someone walk through it? Sure.
But maybe there are situations where, for a variety of reasons—maybe
there is another person involved that the SEC is talking to—and I just
think that each investigation is very different from another and we are
prevented from giving information.
I would note that if we subpoena someone for information, which I
guess is not your situation, they can request a copy of the Formal Order
of Investigation in a case. But I guess that would not apply to a
whistleblower because they are voluntarily providing information. But
that would be an exception to the fact that our investigations are
confidential and nonpublic, is if we give someone a subpoena, they can
ask for the Formal Order of Investigation, and that would tell them that
we have an investigation open.
IAN ENGORON: And, Ms. BrightSky, from the compliance or
corporation’s perspective?
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ALICE BRIGHTSKY: I think, contrary to what you guys have
said—and it does not sound like a lot of nonmeritorious claims is the issue
necessarily for the Commission—I think it is an issue for corporations
and compliance departments. But I do not know that it is one that we can
solve necessarily.
It may just be part of having a really open speak-up culture and open
reporting system. You are going to necessarily get complaints or claims,
allegations, from employees who do not fully understand whether or not
a violation has occurred or necessarily the seriousness of the situation they
are reporting on.
I mean, are there instances of “I was in a meeting and everybody got
a red pen and I got a black pen and I am upset about it.” Those things
occur, right?
I think the way you address it internally from a corporation
perspective is to educate on what the purpose of those hotlines is, how to
best assess a situation, but also encourage and accept that some of those
claims coming through are going to be nonmeritorious, and that is just the
price you pay to have a speak-up culture and to encourage open reporting.
So for every five or six claims that are baseless, at the end of the
day—you treat everything seriously and you investigate with the same
protocol as you would anything else—but if at the end of the day one in
five claims or five in ten claims are baseless—well, we are thinking about
the ones that are not baseless, and that we have encouraged everybody to
raise a hand, and we are supporting those as we should. So I think it might
be the price we have to pay internally in corporations in order to get that
one in however many merit-based claims.
JASON ZUCKERMAN: If I could add one thing to that, which is,
how do you get employees to speak up to their employer? Do not focus
on the employee’s motive. I see all too often an instinct to say, “Why did
he or she make a report? The employee is speaking up because they got a
bad performance review, because they want to get an edge over someone
else, etc.” Questioning the whistleblower’s motive can backfire. The
employer should focus on the disclosure, not on the whistleblower’s
motive.
ALICE BRIGHTSKY: Yes, I agree with that.
IAN ENGORON: Thank you for all those great answers.
We have one more question before we head to Q&A from the
audience.
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I recently wrote a Student Note on whistleblowing and specifically
about the definition of a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank.156 I am
paraphrasing a little bit here, but a whistleblower is basically “any
individual or someone acting jointly with others who provides
information of possible securities violations to the Commission in a
manner established by rule or regulation by the Commission.”
Right now, the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits all agree that
definition means a whistleblower must provide information directly to the
Commission.157 The source of the tension is how that definition interacts
with the anti-retaliation protections provided in Subsection (h), which
states that Sarbanes-Oxley internal reporters should be protected.158 So
my Note aims to resolve some of that tension by redefining Section (a)(6)
as an express grant of authority by Congress through the SEC to decide
how someone reports information to the Commission.159 So if the SEC
decides that by reporting to your employer by regulation that is reporting
to the Commission, then that is their prerogative.160
None of the courts, unfortunately, spend much time addressing
Section (a)(6), and it is mostly the interplay between (a)(6) and (h)(3), but
I wonder if you can comment on whether or not you think this argument
holds any weight?
Anyone can start us off.
JENNIFER M. PACELLA: I think that is a great argument, and good
for you for writing about that. That is wonderful.
IAN ENGORON: Thank you.
JENNIFER M. PACELLA: That could certainly be a way to interpret
it. I have not seen others make that argument, either. I think that the
definition of whistleblower is problematic for many reasons. It does
contain those words—to report by rule or regulation in a manner
established by the SEC161—so I think the meaning may be open for
interpretation.
The word “whistleblower” itself is used elsewhere in Dodd-Frank.
The conflict here, of course, as was mentioned, is with the retaliation
156. Ian Engoron, Note, A Novel Approach to Defining “Whistleblower” in DoddFrank, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 257 (2017).
157. See cases cited supra notes 97–99.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2012).
159. Engoron, supra note 156, at 263–64.
160. Id.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6), (h).
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piece. There is protection for retaliation if a “whistleblower” makes a
report that is required or protected under Sarbanes-Oxley—and, as we
know, Sarbanes-Oxley does protect internal whistleblowers.162
Some would argue that the problem relates to how and when this
language came through congressional committees and how the defined
terms may have changed along the way before reaching the final version
of the statute. I think you make a valid argument, that it could possibly be
interpreted as how the SEC will receive the information, whether it is
through an internal report that goes up the chain within the company or if
it is from the whistleblower externally reporting to the agency. I cannot
wait to read the Supreme Court’s decision on this exact matter, but I think
that is a very good argument.
IAN ENGORON: Great. Thank you to all the panelists for a great
panel.
We are going to open the floor up to questions and answers from the
audience. Does anybody have any questions?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Let me address this question to Jason—or
maybe more of a comment—and that is: in terms of the Justice
Department not going after Wall Street executives for taking down the
global financial system, and the recent book, The Chickenshit Club,163
which I believe refers to Eric Holder and his administration, what are your
thoughts, Jason?
JASON ZUCKERMAN: I am right next to someone who worked for
years as a high-level prosecutor. The reality is that—and I would be
interested in getting her insights—it is very difficult to prosecute
individuals, to prove the requisite level of knowledge, for example, that
they knew they were making a false statement about a toxic subprime
mortgage security.
Yes, I agree that the revolving door is a big problem in prosecuting
white collar crime. Eric Holder is an honorable person. But where was he
coming from when President Obama appointed him as Attorney General?
He came from a big corporate law firm164 where he did work on behalf of
162.
163.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2012).
JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS
TO PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES (2017).
164. Eric H. Holder, Jr., COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, https://www.cov.com/en/
professionals/h/eric-holder [https://perma.cc/4WMZ-GVNW] (last visited Dec. 22,
2017).
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pharmaceutical companies, defending claims brought under the False
Claims Act.
The new SEC Chair, as you had argued earlier, is coming from one
of the most prestigious Wall Street law firms,165 and represented many of
the large New York banks.
The SEC and DOJ have a revolving door problem, and I think we
need to do something about it.
When you bring people in whose primary work experience consists
of representing large and powerful corporations, that experience or
perspective will certainly influence their viewpoint. When they have
made millions and millions of dollars defending or advancing the interests
of large banks, those earnings will likely affect their perspective.
I respect former Chair Mary Jo White and believe she did an
unbelievable job at the SEC. When she was at the helm, the SEC was
more active in enforcing the securities law than it ever was in its history.
And she had been at a big firm before coming to the SEC as Chair.166
So there are people who go to the SEC or to other agencies out of
these big firms who are there for the right reason. But some of them, at
least in my view, are there for just a few years to get very good experience
and then return to a lucrative position at a law firm or in-house.
I am concerned that even though large banks have paid huge fines,167
they might determine that it is more profitable to violate the law and pay
a fine later.
And the new SEC Chair has made it clear at his confirmation hearing
that he wants to avoid imposing large penalties for securities law
violations because such penalties are harmful to shareholders.168 I
165. Biography: Jay Clayton, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION, https://
www.sec.gov/biography/jay-clayton [https://perma.cc/Q3A9-ZP36] (last visited Dec. 22,
2017).
166. Mary Jo White, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, https://www.debevoise.com/
maryjowhite?tab=biography [https://perma.cc/K7GS-VTGH] (last visited Dec. 22,
2017).
167. John W. Schoen, 7 Years on from Crisis, $150 Billion in Bank Fines and
Penalties, CNBC (Apr. 30, 2015, 2:32 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/30/7-yearson-from-crisis-150-billion-in-bank-fines-and-penalties.html [https://perma.cc/Q8XMJT8Y].
168. Dave Michaels & Andrew Ackerman, SEC Chairman Nominee Jay Clayton
Calls for Scaling Back Regulations to Encourage IPOs, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 23, 2017,
5:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-chairman-nominee-jay-clayton-says-pastwall-street-work-is-a-strength-1490281093 [https://perma.cc/VWU9-N25V].
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disagree. Why should shareholders get off the hook if they profited from
the fraud?
I am concerned about an article I saw in today’s Wall Street Journal
reporting that the SEC will lose staff in the Division of Enforcement.169
They will likely have to cut at least one hundred people.170 The SEC’s
annual budget is $1.4 to 1.6 billion.171 There are hedge fund CEOs who
make over $1 billion per year.172 How is the SEC supposed to hold Wall
Street accountable when the SEC is so understaffed?
The large banks likely realize that they cannot repeal most of the
anti-fraud laws, so instead they ensure that regulators lack the resources
to enforce those laws.
There are not a lot of folks on Capitol Hill who are arguing to
increase the SEC’s budget, but the lobbyists for the banks are effective in
ensuring that the SEC is understaffed.
It was not that long ago that we had a massive financial crisis because
the SEC and other regulators were asleep at the wheel. If you add up all
of the lost economic output and all of the other costs associated with the
Great Recession, it ranges anywhere from about $9 trillion to about $18
trillion.173
That was not that long ago. How is it that we are doing the same
thing again, undermining the regulators, and easing regulation of the large
banks?
The big banks are very profitable now. I do not see why we need to
deregulate the financial services industry.

169. Dave Michaels, SEC Signals Pullback from Prosecutorial Approach to
Enforcement, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 26, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/sec-signals-pullback-from-prosecutorial-approach-to-enforcement-1509055200
[https://perma.cc/S7QC-6K4E].
170. Id.
171. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FY 2018 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION,
FY 2018 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN, FY 2016 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT 14–15
(2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/secfy18congbudgjust.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M8ALRH3].
172. Nathan Vardi, The 25 Highest-Earning Hedge Fund Managers and Traders,
FORBES (Mar. 14, 2017, 9:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2017/
03/14/hedge-fund-managers/#34ede12b6e79 [https://perma.cc/FBT3-GL4F].
173. Eduardo Porter, Recession’s True Cost Is Still Being Tallied, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/business/economy/the-cost-of-thefinancial-crisis-is-still-being-tallied.html [https://perma.cc/7AHB-LH5H].
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ALICE BRIGHTSKY: I want to interject because I love that book.
My students know I love that book. Whether you agree with the premise
or not, it is just an excellent book. Everyone should read it. It should be
required reading.
One of the greatest ironies, though, that the book is really premised
on is that in one of the few instances in which we did go after account
executives and we did not have the policy of “too big to fail,” the DOJ
learned the wrong lesson from that. Jesse Eisinger really bases the whole
book on this, that the fall of Arthur Andersen174 and the public outcry as
a result of that, of ordinary people losing their jobs and what that meant
for society, that the DOJ really—and these are not my words and this is
not necessarily my opinion, but the premise of the book is that the DOJ
took the wrong message from that, and it trickled throughout, at least from
his perspective, the entire enforcement community.
It was the last time that all of the agencies really sort of rallied
together in an organized fashion to conduct this large-scale investigation.
It was not a foregone conclusion that Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling would get
prosecuted or that the prosecutions would succeed.175 It took a lot of hard
work and a lot of coordination between the agencies.
So his argument is that where that should have been a raging success
and considered as such, the exact opposite got communicated to them,
and as a result of lots of other things that happened politically, etc., the
agency kind of lost its mojo, if you will, and lost its skills in prosecuting
these really complicated financial crimes cases.
That is a really interesting irony to me, and it is one that I had not
thought about until I really read the book and was forced to kind of go
back to 2002 or 2001 and think back on what it was like, especially in
New York City at that time.
IAN ENGORON: Ms. Weinstock?
JUDITH WEINSTOCK: I am feeling a little defensive. I feel it
necessary to say that I have worked for the government for my entire legal
career. I started at the Manhattan DA’s office in 1997. In 2014, after the
financial crisis, I moved over to the SEC. I think my colleague also has
been there for four years.
174. The Fall of Andersen, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 1, 2002), http://www.chicago
tribune.com/news/chi-0209010315sep01-story.html [https://perma.cc/KS4S-2AXQ].
175. Gina Sunseri & Sylvie Rottman, Enron Verdict: Ken Lay Guilty on All Counts,
Skilling on 19 Counts, ABC NEWS (May 25, 2006), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/
LegalCenter/story?id=2003728&page=1 [https://perma.cc/E959-7Y7H].
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TRACEY McNEIL: No, nine years.
JUDITH WEINSTOCK: Nine years, okay.
So I do not consider myself, obviously, part of the revolving door.
I have not read the book. Sometimes some of these books are a little
too close to home. I have only seen the highest level of integrity in
government. I have seen people wanting to do the right thing. I think that,
as I think someone noted, high-level executives can sometimes insulate
themselves. There may not be a paper trail. There may be conduct that is
bad but does not rise to the level of intentional conduct.
I take issue with the notion that, because of the revolving-door
policy, certain people did not get prosecuted. That has not been my
experience. It is certainly not an observation that I have made.
With respect to the SEC Enforcement staff going down, it is not that
it is being cut. It is that there is attrition and the federal government is in
a hiring freeze. We will see what fiscal year 2018 brings.
I think the article in the Journal was—I was not at Steve Peikin’s
speech, so I cannot speak to everything that he was saying, but I think it
is a recognition that we are in a different administration now and there are
hiring freezes and we may have to make certain choices based on that.
But being where I sit and reviewing tips, complaints, and referrals
that come into the New York Office, I believe that cases that need to be
pursued are getting pursued. That is my spiel.
JASON ZUCKERMAN: I just want to clarify something. I interact
with a lot of dedicated public servants at the SEC and other agencies, and
have the highest respect for them.
But there is a real issue with the revolving door. It is important to
evaluate the potential impact of enforcement attorneys at the SEC
knowing that they will likely take lucrative positions on the other side.
But I believe that most folks working at the SEC and at other
regulators are there for the right reason, i.e., to vindicate the public
interest.
TRACEY McNEIL: Just one comment to echo what you were
saying, Judith. I am not feeling defensive at all. I am pleased and proud
to be at the SEC. I came over in 2008, so I have been there a while.
There were a lot of us who came over in 2008. I think they lifted a
hiring freeze at the time, and there were a lot of us leaving large firms or
corporations and coming to the SEC. We came to the SEC to do the good
work and not to make money, because we were making much more in the
private sector.
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The other thing I want to point out is the scope of the SEC’s mission
alongside our workforce statistics. We are the agency that regulates the
U.S. capital markets. We are there to protect investors, facilitate capital
formation, and make sure the markets run as they should.
We are headquartered in D.C. and we have eleven regional offices
around the country. We have about 4,500 employees across headquarters
and the regional offices. I might be a little low on this number, but we
conduct examinations or review filings covering somewhere around
30,000 registrants and entities every year.
So I do feel we are underfunded; I do feel we are understaffed. That
is my plug for all of you. When the hiring freeze is over, I hope you
consider a career at the SEC as an option.
We have a serious mission and mandate, and I feel that all of us walk
through those turnstiles every day trying to do the absolute best that we
can.
I have not read that book, but I may. You read the books, you see the
headlines, but it is rare that I hear anyone articulate what our small but
mighty workforce is here to do and how much we have to do. I want to
commend my SEC colleagues for the good work that we do with the
resources that we have.
JUDITH WEINSTOCK: I strongly agree with that.
I have to make one plug for the New York Office because the New
York Office recently started a Twitter account. We want to get as many
followers as we can. I want you to know it is newyork_sec.176 We need to
get more followers than our Fort Worth Regional Office.
TRACEY McNEIL: I encourage you all to look at the SEC’s Fort
Worth Regional Office Twitter feed also.177 Follow New York, but Fort
Worth, once they get wind of this, might step up their Twitter game. They
are pretty good.
IAN ENGORON: Thank you, sir, for that great question. It spawned
some great discussion.
All right. Thank you, everyone. On behalf of the Fordham Journal
of Corporate & Financial Law, I want to thank everyone for attending
today’s symposium. I would especially like to thank Chief Norberg and
176. @NewYork_SEC, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/newyork_sec?lang=en [https://
perma.cc/T43Y-3X6L] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
177. @FortWorth_SEC, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/FortWorth_SEC?ref_src=tw
src%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
[https://perma.cc/47F9-NR
GY] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
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all of our panelists for their contributions and for engendering an in-depth
discussion on whistleblowers in the era of Sarbanes-Oxley and DoddFrank.
I would also like to thank Professors Sean Griffith and Caroline
Gentile, the Corporate Journal’s faculty advisors, for their help and
efforts organizing this event. It would not have been possible without
them. The Journal is lucky to have such wonderful faculty to work with.
I would also like to thank Shanelle Holley for all of her assistance,
and everyone from her office for making today possible.
Finally, I would like to recognize our Editor-in-Chief, Tess Sadler,
and the Journal’s Symposium Committee for their help as well.
On behalf of the Journal, thank you absolutely everyone for making
this such a great and successful event.

